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We are running out of Internet addresses. This paper evaluates address transfer policies 
that Internet governance agencies are considering as a response to the depletion of the 
IPv4 address space. The paper focuses on proposals to allow organizations holding IPv4 
addresses to sell address blocks to other organizations willing to buy them. This paper 
analyzes the economics of the proposed transfer policies, and conducts a systematic 
comparison of the policies proposed in the three main world Internet regions. It 
concludes that: 
 
• Address transfer markets offer a pragmatic solution to the problem of reclaiming 
a substantial amount of unused IP address space and of re-allocating addresses to 
their most efficient uses 
• The risks of instituting well-designed address transfer policies are small when 
compared to the potential benefits. The change is less radical than it appears. 
• A failure to legitimize address transfer markets would create substantial risks of 
the institutionalization of gray or black markets in IPv4 address resources, leading 
to a deterioration of accurate registration and administration of the legacy address 
space. This could have severe negative implications for Internet security. 
• One should not prevent IPv4 address transfers in order to push organizations into 
IPv6. If migration to IPv6 is beneficial, a transfer market could only prolong the 
transition, it could not stop it. We do not know how long it will take the global 
Internet to transition to IPv6, or even whether such a migration will succeed. Given 
the uncertainties surrounding dual stack implementation, a longer transition 
period may turn out to be very helpful. 
• The proposed address transfer policies being considered by RIPE and APNIC are 
more liberal than ARIN’s. Most of the legacy IPv4 address space is in North 
America; thus, the policies ARIN adopts have the most importance and should be 
formulated with the good of the global Internet in mind. RIPE, ARIN and APNIC 
should strive to harmonize their transfer policies and (in the longer term) make 
inter-regional transfers possible. 
 
Introduction and background 
What happens when the Internet addresses run out? That question has been generating 
growing concern among Internet operators and policy analysts. The problem is 
fundamental to the future of the Internet. 
  
The Internet we know is based upon a data communication protocol known as 
Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4). IPv4 is a software procedure that moves data packets 
from one unique numerical address to the other.1 The 1981 standard that defined 
                                                 
1
 RFC 791, Internet Protocol, DARPA INTERNET PROGRAM PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION, September 1981. See also RFC 
790, Assigned Numbers, Jon Postel, September 1981.   
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 Internet Protocol created a fixed address field of 32 bits, which creates a mathematical 
possibility of about 4 billion unique addresses. 
 
 Because of continuing Internet growth, IPv4 addresses have become scarce and 
valuable resources. Put simply, we are running out of them. At the middle of 2008, the 
last remaining stash of unused address blocks – the so-called “unallocated address 
number pool” – had dwindled to only 39 blocks. In recent times, these blocks of 
addresses have been distributed to regional address management entities at a rate of 
about 12 per year, which means we have only about a three year supply left. Demand 
may accelerate as exhaustion of this pool approaches, but even if it doesn’t the end of 
the unallocated pool is within sight.2 
  
 The problem of address scarcity is as severe for the Internet economy as the oil 
shocks and gasoline shortages of the 1970s were to the industrial economy.  
Address shortages could act as a brake on the growth of the Internet. Emerging Internet 
economies in Africa, Asia and Latin America are just beginning to fulfill their potential 
level of Internet development.  
  
In principle, a new Internet standard, IPv6, solves the problem of address 
scarcity because it has a very large address space (2128 addresses).  But the new Internet 
standard is not compatible with the old one. Thus, anyone who implements IPv6 and 
throws away their IPv4 capabilities is going to be isolated, cut off from the vast majority 
of communication partners, web sites and services associated with the old Internet. One 
must think of the transition from IPv4 to IPv6 as the (possibly temporary) co-existence of 
two distinct “Internets.”3 One way to keep the two Internets universally interconnected is 
for adopters of the new standard to run both versions of Internet protocol. This is known 
as running “dual stacks.” Another way is to use Network Address Translation – Protocol 
Translation (NAT-PT).4 Both methods require IPv6 users to use IPv4 addresses during the 
transition period. During the migration to IPv6, users will not engage in simple 
substitution of IPv6 addresses for IPv4 addresses. IPv4 address resources will continue 
to be in demand.5 
                                                 
2 A 2005 study by Cisco’s Tony Hain projected depletion of the IANA pool by 2010. Tony Hain, "A Pragmatic Report on 
IPv4 Address Space Consumption," The Internet Protocol Journal, Volume 8, Number 3. 
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/ac123/ac147/archived_issues/ipj_8-3/ipv4.html Another respected computer 
scientist who, in 2003, projected that the IPv4 address space would last “another three decades or so” now projects the 
depletion date of the IANA pool at January 2011, and the depletion of the regional subpools at November 2011. See 
Geoff Huston, “IPv4 Address Report” http://www.potaroo.net/tools/ipv4/ . For Huston’s earlier study see Geoff Huston, 
"IPv4: How long do we have?" The Internet Protocol Journal Volume 6, Number 4.  
3 The value of networks depends on who else is on the same network. Because of this network externality, users who 
abandon a network that already reaches a large segment of the population are penalized. Network externalities create 
“inertia” that must be overcome by very strong economic or technical advantages of a new standard. See Farrel, J. and 
Saloner, G. 1987. “Competition, Compatibility and Standards: The Economics of Horses, Penguins and Lemmings.” In 
Gabel, ed. Product Standardization and Competitive Strategy. Amersterdam: Elsevier. 
4 See RFC 2766 (2000), “Network Address Translation - Protocol Translation,” http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2766.txt 
5 See the blog post of Dave Piscietello, Feb. 11, 2008: If ‘NAT will save us’ is the war cry of the IPv6 averse part of the 
community, then ‘dual stack will save us’ is the counter-cry of the IPv6 advocates who've left the hard nuts in deployment 
for someone else to crack.” http://www.securityskeptic.com/catRant.htm  
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 How long is that transition period likely to be? No one knows for sure, but efforts 
to model this problem do not yield encouraging results. One group of academics applied 
mathematical diffusion models to IPv6 adoption and projected that the overlap period 
under the most favorable assumptions could take no less than 6 years, and might take 
up to 70 years.6 There are still Internet technical people who openly claim that IPv6 will 
never succeed in reaching the critical mass needed to replace the IPv4 Internet.7 
Another recent economic assessment of the incentives to migrate also came up with 
pessimistic conclusions.8 Thus, it would be unwise for IP addressing policy to be based 
on the assumption that a global migration to IPv6 is inevitable. Sound address 
management should be designed to conserve and reclaim IPv4 resources and ensure 
that they are assigned to their most important, highly valued uses. 
 
 What should be done? This paper evaluates transitional policies that Internet 
governance agencies are considering as a response to the depletion of the IPv4 address 
space. In particular, the paper focuses on proposals to allow organizations holding IPv4 
addresses to sell address blocks to other organizations willing to buy them. IP address 
transfer markets, as they are called, have been proposed as a pragmatic way to extend 
the life of the IP address space. One important benefit of such a policy is to provide 
incentives for existing holders of addresses to release unused address resources. 
Another possible benefit is the way it might rationalize and make more transparent an 
underground economy in address resources. Transfer markets also increase the 
autonomy of Internet users by providing an alternative to the centralized administrative 
processes that currently control address allocations. Fairly liberal address transfer 
market proposals are being considered in the European and Asia-Pacific regions. A more 
restrictive transfer proposal is also under consideration in North America. 
  
 This paper analyzes the economics of the proposed transfer policies, and 
conducts a systematic comparison of the policies proposed in the three main world 
Internet regions. It concludes that:  
• Address transfer markets offer a pragmatic solution to the problem of reclaiming 
a substantial amount of unused IP address space and of re-allocating addresses to 
their efficient uses 
• The risks of instituting well-designed address transfer policies are small when 
compared to the potential benefits. The change is less radical than it appears. 
• A failure to legitimize address transfer markets would create substantial risks of 
the institutionalization of gray or black markets in IPv4 address resources, leading 
                                                 
6 Elmore, H., L. Jean Camp and Brandon Stephens. 2008 "Diffusion and Adoption of IPv6 in the ARIN Region.” Paper 
presented at the 2008 Workshop on the Economics of Information Security, June 25-28, Tuck School of Business, 
Dartmouth College, Hanover NH.  http://weis2008.econinfosec.org/papers/Elmore.pdf  
7 J.H. Woodyatt is one of many. See his interesting blog post of March 2008 http://jhw.vox.com/library/post/the-future-
without-ipv6.html  
8 Benjamin Edelman, 2008. "Running Out of Numbers: The Impending Scarcity of IP Addresses and What To Do About It." 
Unpublished paper draft, http://www.benedelman.org/publications/runningout-draft.pdf   
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 to a deterioration of accurate registration and administration of the legacy address 
space. This could have severe negative implications for Internet security. 
• IPv4 address transfers should not be prevented as part of an attempt to push 
organizations into IPv6. If migration to IPv6 is beneficial, a transfer market could 
only prolong, not stop, the transition. We do not know how long it will take the 
global Internet to transition to IPv6, or even whether such a migration will 
succeed. Given these uncertainties, a longer transition period may turn out to be 
very helpful. 
• The proposed address transfer policies being considered by RIPE and APNIC are 
more liberal than ARIN’s. All three could be improved in various ways. Most of the 
legacy IPv4 address space is in North America; thus, the policies ARIN adopts have 
the most importance and should be formulated with the good of the global 
Internet in mind. RIPE, ARIN and APNIC should strive to harmonize their transfer 
policies and over the longer term make inter-regional transfers possible. 
 
The significance of this issue goes beyond a narrow assessment of transfer markets as a 
policy. The creation of address transfer policies both reflects and reinforces the growing 
importance of the Regional Internet Address Registries in global Internet governance. 
Thus, this paper supports a broader conclusion which will be explored in greater detail in 
a future IGP paper: 
• For transfer markets to work properly, the registration and enforcement functions 
of the RIRs will need to be strengthened. As the address allocation process 
becomes more institutionalized, we will need stronger public policy frameworks 
for RIRs to operate within. These policy frameworks should retain and respect the 
RIRs’ status as independent self-regulatory entities, but also ensure that their 
policies are constrained by basic human rights protections regarding freedom of 
expression, privacy and due process, as well as economic policies regarding 
competition. 
The IP Address Governance Regime 
To understand the controversy surrounding IPv4 address depletion and transfer markets, 
some description of current institutional arrangements around address management is 
necessary. Address assignments are made in a hierarchical fashion. At the top of the 
hierarchy is ICANN, whose IANA function distributes large blocks of 16,777,216 
addresses (known as /8’s) to one of five regional Internet address registries (RIRs). The 
RIRs then accept applications from organizations with networks that need addresses 
within their territory. Some larger blocks may be assigned directly to end user 
organizations, but most will go to Internet service providers who will then re-assign them 
to their customers. (An “allocation” is an address block given to an Internet service 
provider for intermediate use in selling internet service to other users. An address 
“assignment” is a block given to end users for their own use; e.g., corporations or 
universities with private networks.) 
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  RIRs were created in the 1990s as the Internet protocols began to be widely 
adopted.9 The first Regional Internet Registry, RIPE-NCC, was created in 1991 to serve 
the European region. In 1995 APNIC was created as the RIR to serve the Asia Pacific 
region. Both were incorporated as private sector nonprofits. In 1997, parallel to the 
creation of ICANN, the address administration functions performed by several U.S. 
government contractors were privatized and placed in the hands of a new nonprofit 
entity known as the American Registry for Internet Numbers (ARIN). All three of the RIRs 
rely on a private sector-based, contractual model of governance. 
 
  
 
Figure 1: Address Block Delegation 
 
 The creation of the RIRs led to tighter and more formalized address allocation 
and assignment policies, and more careful registration and tracking policies. Before they 
were created, however, a large portion of the IPv4 address space had already been 
                                                 
9 See RFC 1174 (1990) and RFC 1466 (1993) for the earliest documents documenting the rationale for creating Regional 
Internet Registries.   
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 assigned or allocated, perhaps as much as half. Many of these “legacy allocations” 
made before 1997 are still held without any contractual obligations.10  
A Common Pool Model? 
The RIRs have developed a consistent ideology about address management 
policies, which are codified in their own policy documents.11  Address resources are 
considered a “shared public resource” and the RIRs are considered their “stewards.” 
Addresses are said to be “loaned” to private users, not sold, and users are not supposed 
to gain any property rights in an address block they are granted.12 Although RIRs finance 
themselves via address-related fees and membership charges, they insist that members 
are not “buying” addresses but are merely paying the RIR for services associated with 
administering the address space and its registry. The RIRs formally prohibit assignees 
from reselling or transferring the addresses directly to other private users. But the line 
between permitted and not-permitted transfers is gray, not bright and clear. Internet 
service providers who hold address allocations sell services commercially to their 
customers, and among these services are fixed IP addresses, with specific charges 
associated with addresses. Also, when companies with IP address allocations or 
assignments are merged or acquired, RIRs allow the address resources to be transferred 
along with ownership of the company. 
  
 The RIR ideology of resource stewardship has some similarities to the economic 
model of a common pool resource.13 The common pool model is used to govern natural 
resource use in other contexts, such as unlicensed radio spectrum, forests, water or 
marine fisheries. Common pool governance is typically employed when two conditions 
are met: consumption of the resource is rival (i.e., one person’s use or consumption 
prevents another person from also using/consuming it), and it is difficult to exclude 
people from appropriating the resource (which makes the model of markets based on 
private property rights difficult to apply). The task for a governance agency is to regulate 
appropriation of the resource in a way that maintains its value. 
                                                 
10 Like many processes associated with the Internet, the distribution of IPv4 addresses began very informally in the early 
1980s, when the Internet was basically a research project. A computer scientist at the University of Southern California 
handed out big swaths of the available space to members of the American military-industrial-university complex: MIT, 
Stanford, Hewlett Packard, Motorola, General Electric, Halliburton, Defense Department agencies, etc.  
11 See the general APNIC FAQ, http://www.apnic.net/info/faq/apnic_faq/obtaining.html; the ARIN Number Resources 
Policy Manual http://www.arin.net/policy/nrpm.html; and the RIPE IPv4 Address Assignment and Allocation Policies for 
the RIPE NCC Service Region http://www.ripe.net/ripe/docs/ipv4-policies.html  
12 For the seminal document contrasting the “address ownership” policy with an “address lending” policy and arguing that 
only the lending model was consistent with the need for hierarchical route aggregation, see RFC 2008, "Implications of 
Various Address Allocation Policies for Internet Routing" Y. Rekhter, T. Li. (1996). It is important to emphasize that this 
important policy document did not argue against address ownership policies or private transfers on equity grounds, nor 
did it justify “needs based assessment” of address requests. It simply noted that for the Internet to continue growing that 
routes needed to be aggregated under providers, so when private users switched providers they would have to give up 
their addresses. 
13 For a sampling of the institutional economics literature, see Elinor Ostrom, 1990. Governing the Commons: The 
evolution of institutions for collective action Oxford University Press; Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner, James Walker, 1994. 
Rules, Games, and Common-pool Resources. University of Michigan Press; Anderson, Terry L., Grewell, J. Bishop (2000) 
"Property Rights Solutions for the Global Commons: Bottom-Up or Top-Down?" In: Duke Environmental Law & Policy 
Forum, Vol. X, No. 2, Spring 2000 
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Under certain conditions, common pool governance has very good economic and 
social properties. Simple, collectively applicable limits on the number of trees one can 
cut or fish one can remove, for example, conserves the resource pool while maintaining 
easy access to the resource and very low transaction costs. In the case of unlicensed 
spectrum, anyone who wants to offer service in an unlicensed wireless band can enter 
freely without prior permission from regulatory authorities. Appropriation is governed by 
technical limits on transmission power and protocol specifications, which prevent any 
single transmitter from hogging too much of the spectrum resource. 
  
 Despite the appealing ideology of common resource stewardship that appears to 
underlay RIR policies, there are major failings in the application of the common pool 
model to IP address resources. Address consumption is rival, but it is not that difficult to 
exclude unauthorized people from using them. Under the RIR regimes, appropriation 
from the common pool is not based on a simple and uniformly applicable appropriation 
limit, but on complex, expensive, case-by-case administrative procedures. In order to get 
resources from the address pool, applicants must individually request resources from 
the RIR and demonstrate their “need.” The RIR bases its decision on engineering studies 
of the applicant’s plans. This is more like a central planning regime than classical 
common pool governance. Under conditions of intense scarcity, such a process is not 
only costly but inherently inaccurate because of the asymmetry of information between 
the requestor and the granting agency. 
 
Another crucial difference between the RIR regime and what we normally think 
of as common pool management is that when IP addresses are not used by those to 
whom they have been allocated, they do not automatically return into the common pool 
for use by others. Those who have been allocated or assigned address resources retain 
exclusivity over an address block regardless of whether they are using the resources. 
Cumbersome administrative processes are required to move resources from a nonuser 
to a prospective user. In a true common pool model, the IP address space would work 
like a gigantic DHCP address pool.14 Organizations would grab addresses (like catching 
fish) only when they were actually using them, and as soon as they were not using them 
the addresses would be released back into the common pool for use by others. 
  
That is not how things work now. Organizations that have been given IP 
addresses retain them until they choose to give them up, and users have very weak 
incentives to return addresses to RIRs.15 If they don’t give them back, nothing bad 
happens. If they do give them back, they incur both administrative costs (the cost of 
altering their records and interacting with the RIR) and opportunity costs (the cost of 
                                                 
14 DHCP stands for Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol, and defines mechanisms through which clients can be assigned 
a network address for a finite lease, allowing for serial reassignment of network addresses to different clients when one 
client ceases using an address. See RFC 2131. 
15 In principle APNIC allocates addresses on an “annually renewable” basis. In practice it seems to rely primarily on the 
organization’s initiative to reclaim addresses. 
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 foregoing future use of the addresses). RIRs’ ability to monitor the actual usage of 
assignments is limited. Even if they did have perfect information about actual usage and 
“needs” of applicants, their enforcement powers are weak. They cannot impose financial 
penalties on organizations; they can only terminate a service contract and threaten 
never to assign the organization any more addresses. Even this does not directly deprive 
the users of addresses; it only signals to Internet service providers that the organization 
is not the legitimate holder of the address block, which may lead ISPs to refuse to route 
packets to those addresses.16 Another crucial limitation on ARIN specifically is the large 
number of legacy address allocations which are held without any contractual 
obligations. Legacy allocations were made before the RIRs existed, and RIRs lack the 
authority to recover them until and unless the holders of the address resources 
voluntarily choose to sign “Legacy Registry Service Agreements.”17 
  
In sum, the RIR regime captures only half, possibly less, of the standard benefits 
associated with common pool management. It regulates appropriation effectively, but it 
raises the cost of access and does a very poor job of facilitating reclamation and reuse.  
Latent markets and Unused Resources 
Given the major imperfections in the realization of common pool objectives, it is 
not surprising to discover latent markets for address resources and underground 
transfers taking place. In June 2008, for example, a private sector participant stated 
publicly on the ARIN Public Policy Mailing list, “I have been aware of people …buying, 
selling and using subterfuge to obtain IP allocations for as long as I have been in the 
industry (the past 8 years).”18 The examples provided by this person are worth quoting at 
length: 
 
a. Three companies merged into one.  For many months after they merged they 
continued to interact with ARIN as separate entities, obtaining far more IP 
allocations than they would have been able to as a single entity.  Even today, this 
single entity (which has now recently merged again), interacts with ARIN using 
two separate, but related entity names and two separate ORG IDs. 
 
b. Every month I run into people who are willing to sell me their /18, /19, /20 for 
a fee.  It is my understanding that such transactions are usually structured so 
that other [usually worthless] assets or an entire shell entity are included in the 
                                                 
16 The primary regulatory leverage the RIRs have comes from their maintenance of IP address registries and their 
associated Whois service. The whois service allows Internet connectivity providers to look up the identity of organizations 
that hold address blocks. ISPs will usually not issue route announcements for address blocks unless they first check IP 
address Whois to see that these blocks have some relation to their client. Transfers of IP addresses that bypass the RIR 
registry, therefore, might have trouble being routed or carried by ISPs. When RIRs revoke an address allocation or 
assignment, another user could be given those addresses. Other ISPs may cease to carry route announcements for the 
prior address block holder. 
17 ARIN’s new Legacy RSA contracts, http://www.arin.net/registration/legacy/index.html, bring uncontracted legacy 
address resource holders into the contractual system but promise not to reclaim unused resources.  
18 Jay Sudowski, Handy Networks LLC. Posting to ARIN Public Policy Mailing List June 20, 2008. 
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 sale to pass ARIN scrutiny.  
 
c. For a time, I did work for an entity that had previous bad blood with ARIN… and 
managed to obtain 3 /18s on the after market.  From what I gather, this is not 
all that unusual.  
 
d. There are consultants out there who, for a fee, guarantee you will get an IP 
allocation from ARIN.  They are able to accomplish [this] because they control a 
large amount of IP space for entities that they work for, and they SWIP out space 
from those entities to the entity paying them for the direct allocation. …  
 
e. ARIN members continue to report IP usage by customers that have long since 
left their network, inflating their actual need and utilization percentages, 
allowing them to obtain unnecessary allocations from ARIN. 
 
As our analysis of incentives above suggested, reclamation of unused IP 
addresses should be a weak point in the regime. Empirical evidence supports this 
expectation. There are strong reasons to believe that a very large part of the allocated 
IPv4 address space is unused, and thus eligible to be transferred. This is especially true 
in the North American region. An OECD report cited Geoff Huston, Chief Scientist at 
APNIC, that 90% of RIR-allocated space is routed while only 40% of legacy space is 
routed.19 The same OECD report cites surveys that examine the population of visible IPv4 
Internet hosts, and find that “only a low percentage of advertised addresses respond, 
which could mean that even among routed address space, significant address space is 
unused.” One study finds that only 3.6% of allocated addresses are actually occupied by 
visible hosts.20 
 
In the legacy allocations especially, it is well known that large swaths of unused 
address blocks are so underutilized that they can be surreptitiously taken over by 
spammers, illegal pornographers, or other Internet malefactors with a need to operate 
under cover. An antispam website from 2004 maintains a long list of hijacked IP 
address blocks, which includes an entire /8 originally allocated to Halliburton in the 
1980s.21 An article by Ronald F. Guilmette documents how two /16 address blocks, 
containing tens of thousands of IPv4 addresses, were hijacked from NASA and a small 
software company and used to facilitate spamming.22 In these two cases, the address 
blocks were essentially abandoned, as their delegated users had completely lost track of 
their status and were not even aware of their appropriation by a third party. 
                                                 
19 OECD Report p. 26-27. 
20 Ibid.  
21 Google cache of The Complete Whois web site, retrieved 10 June 2008, 
http://completewhois.org/hijacked/hijackers.htm  
22 http://www.47-usc-230c2.org/ 47-usc-230c2, A web site maintained by Ronald F. Guilmette.  
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 When the Free Pool Runs Out 
The model of common pool resource management assumes that there are free, 
unallocated resources in the wild, and the task of the resource manager is to set 
appropriation rules. The appropriation rules of the RIRs were based on a “justified need” 
criterion where assessments of “need” were based on simple engineering studies. 
  
As the IPv4 free pool runs out, the justified need approach to IPv4 address 
management loses its relevance. As the number of unallocated blocks approaches zero, 
IPv4 addresses can only be acquired through transfers from one holder of address 
resources to another, not through initial appropriation from a free pool. Traditional need 
assessment methods are of no relevance in this situation. In the post-free pool world, 
engineering plans that “justify” the use of a certain number of addresses may or may not 
justify taking addresses away from someone else. To allocate the resource under these 
new circumstances, an RIR would have to decide which plan was more important or 
more valuable, and remove addresses from one user to give them to another. To justify 
transferring address resources from one user to another, one must make judgments 
about relative need and the social value of the resource in alternate uses.  
 
The only feasible way to discover how valuable the address resources are in 
alternate uses is to institute competitive bidding for them.23 The only alternative to 
competitive bidding is a central planning regime; i.e., ongoing “beauty contests” in which 
a centralized agency tried to assess the relative merit of every internet-related business 
in their region. In addition to more closely scrutinizing existing uses and users, RIRs 
would also have to give themselves more power to take away resources from parties 
they decided didn’t really need them, or were needed more by someone else. Such a 
policy would make RIRs into dictators of who could enter the Internet economy and 
which business plans were more valuable than others. RIRs lack both the authority and 
the knowledge to judge relative need and aggressively re-allocate address resources 
across an entire world region. Also, RIR decisions to take away addresses from one party 
and give them to another would likely become ensnared in controversies and litigation. 
Future resource allocation must rely on decentralized judgments about the value of 
resources by the actual holders of address resources. RIRs should act more as title 
agencies than resource managers. 
Transfer Policies as a Response to IPv4 Depletion 
To the credit of the RIRs and their associated communities, the problem of IPv4 
address depletion has led to some innovative policy proposals. Each of the three largest 
RIRs is considering proposals to permit market-based address transfers. In the temporal 
order of their introduction, they are:   
                                                 
23 This was the conclusion of the famous “socialist calculation debate” of the 1920s and ‘30s, which nearly all modern 
economists recognize as proving that a price system based on trading is needed to efficiently allocate resources across a 
wide variety of alternative uses and users. For a good summary of this debate see Vaughn, Karen. 1980. Economic 
Calculation under Socialism: The Austrian Contribution. Economic Inquiry 18:535–54. 
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• Asia-Pacific region: prop-050-v002: IPv4 address transfers (Huston)  
• European region: RIPE 2007-08, “Enabling Methods for Reallocation of IPv4 
Resources.” (Titley and van Mook) 
• North America region: ARIN: Policy Proposal 2008-2 IPv4 Transfer Policy Proposal 
 
The transfer proposals would allow organizations willing to release address 
resources to benefit monetarily by selling them to another organization who wants them, 
subject to the record keeping requirements and contractual regulations of the RIRs. The 
premise of this policy is that once all the free IPv4 address blocks have been distributed, 
the only way to get more of them is to shift addresses away from users who no longer 
need or want them to users who do need them. By allowing the recipients of address 
blocks to pay the existing holders to give them up, market transfers will create an 
incentive to release unused IPv4 resources. The emergent price system will also clarify 
the economic tradeoffs associated with the use of IP addresses.  
 
The market transfer policy has another, equally powerful motivation. As noted 
before, addresses are already being transferred privately or even hijacked and used 
without authorization. There is a fear that once scarcity increases, a black market will 
evolve and the RIR’s registries will no longer accurately reflect which organization holds 
which address blocks. A breakdown in the accuracy and universality of the RIRs’ 
databases would have severe consequences for the security and orderly management of 
the Internet’s technical infrastructure.  
 
The proposals vary significantly. In general, the RIPE proposal is the simplest and 
most liberal. The APNIC proposal is similar to the RIPE proposal but attaches a few more 
restrictions and costs onto the transacting parties, and has some structural flaws. The 
ARIN proposal, on the other hand, is the most restrictive and complicated policy. As the 
most regulatory of the three, the ARIN proposal nominally legalizes transfers but does so 
in a way that is virtually guaranteed to insure that they never take place.  
 
The next section conducts a systematic analysis of the proposals according to 
five key dimensions: 1) Trigger Date; 2) Territorial restrictions; 3) Eligibility 
restrictions/speculation controls; 4) Fees; and 5) Route Aggregation. The similarities and 
differences among the proposals are summarized in Table 1.  
Trigger Date 
The ARIN proposal says that the transfers it authorizes only start “when IANA 
allocates its last unallocated unicast IPv4 address block.” The RIPE and APNIC proposals 
have no trigger date. The economic rationale for a tying the beginning of a transfer 
policy to the depletion of the IANA free pool is weak. If a party is willing to part with 
address space now and someone else wants it, there is no social benefit to be gained 
from requiring that person to wait for IANA's last unallocated address block to be 
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 dropped, and no harm by allowing them to sell it earlier. Indeed, the person buying the 
address block is leaving free space available for others to take, which seems desirable.  
 
One might see a trigger as necessary to prevent people who received “needs-
based” allocations for free from turning around and reselling them. But if RIRs can really 
determine whether organizations “need” IP addresses as they claim to be able to do, a 
trigger time should be unnecessary. An organization that really needs the address blocks 
they have been assigned will not sell them. Another rationale that has been advanced 
for the ARIN trigger date is that if addresses are still available "for free" from ARIN, then 
organizations that don't qualify for space under current policy would be able to get 
addresses. But this argument reveals a fundamental confusion. It is an attempt to 
preserve the effects of pre-scarcity policies under the new conditions of IPv4 scarcity. As 
noted before, engineering-based “needs assessments” make no sense once the free 
pool is depleted. A transfer market allows the transacting parties to determine which 
party has the greater need. The potential to eliminate burdensome and expensive needs 
assessments is one of its primary virtues.  
Territorial Restrictions 
This is one of the most interesting and difficult problems associated with address 
transfers. In principle, an address transfer market should be global (subject to the need 
to maintain route aggregation) and allow resources not used in one region to be 
transferred to another region where it is needed more. This aspect is most relevant to 
developing countries, which may need to “import” IPv4 addresses from regions such as 
North America which are rich in unused legacy IPv4 addresses. 
 
RIPE and APNIC would allow organizations in different geographic regions to 
transfer addresses between them, as long as they are both members of the same RIR. 
The RIPE and APNIC policies would thus permit inter-regional transfers, with some 
suggesting that the RIRs would become “competing title agencies.” The ARIN policy on 
the other hand is designed to prohibit interregional transfers. The ARIN policy requires 
both that the transferring parties be members of ARIN and that the addresses 
transferred would be used within the ARIN region exclusively. The purpose of this 
restriction is to retain the regional exclusivity of the RIR and avoid competition with 
other registries.  
Eligibility Restrictions/Speculation control 
None of the RIRs are eager to encourage speculative accumulation and rapid 
resale of address resources. The policy goal is to encourage one time transfers of 
allocations and assignments from organizations that do not need them to organizations 
that do need them. If organizations stockpile address resources purely for their resale 
value it could make the IPv4 supply situation less stable and predictable given the 
operational need for IPv4 addresses and the tight supply. Thus the structuring of 
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 transfers to discourage speculation makes sense. The three proposals vary significantly, 
however, in how they handle this:  
1. RIPE’s policy is applicable only to Internet service providers, not end users. This 
makes it the most limited in scope. Aside from that limitation, it provides for the 
most sensible restriction on speculation. It posits that buyers of transferred 
addresses cannot transfer complete or partial blocks of the same address space 
for 24 months. This simple and direct limitation eliminates the possibility of 
acquiring addresses in order to quickly “flip” them in a secondary market. The 
RIPE policy recognizes that there is no need to regulate the selling party to 
achieve this goal. The RIPE policy also does not prevent the recipient from 
engaging in reasonable and graduated stockpiling of addresses that they might 
need over time in order to accommodate risk and uncertainty. Nor does it 
impinge on what these entities do with other address resources not involved in 
the transfer. 
2. APNIC allows any organization that has been assigned addresses to transfer 
them. With regard to speculation, the APNIC policy imposes a blanket restriction 
on the selling party, who cannot receive any IPv4 address allocations or 
assignments from APNIC for a period of 24 months. This regulation is not as well 
designed as the RIPE provision. The restriction on future requests might make 
potential sellers think twice about whether they should give up their current 
address holdings, regardless of whether they have any intention of being 
involved in speculation. Also, this aspect of the policy still does not prevent the 
buying party from quickly reselling its newly received address resources the first 
time it receives some through the new transfer process. True, the restriction on 
receiving more resources from APNIC would catch speculators after they sell the 
resources, but limiting their ability to request additional resources from APNIC 
would miss the target. True address speculators would be more likely to get new 
addresses from the secondary market, not from APNIC. 
3. The ARIN proposal, like the APNIC proposal, allows both end user organizations 
and ISPs to transfer addresses. But it imposes severe restrictions on both the 
selling party and the buying party. It requires purchasers of address resources to 
“pre-qualify” for addresses by subjecting themselves to a traditional ARIN “needs 
assessment” process. Any prospective buyer who does this will discover that 
ARIN will assess not only their request for a transfer, but all of their existing 
allocations. This could deter many potential buyers from applying for fear that 
ARIN might take away addresses rather than authorizing them to get more. The 
releasing party cannot have received any IPv4 addresses, either from ARIN or 
from transfers, in the past 24 months, and cannot request any for the next 24 
months. So anyone who sells resources must remove themselves from the ARIN 
allocation/assignment process for a total of four years. This restriction is punitive 
and ignores the need to encourage legacy address holders to release resources 
they could learn to do without. The restrictions seem to be motivated more by an 
ideological desire to reassert its legacy principle of needs-based address 
allocation, than by an attempt to encourage efficiency-enhancing reclamation. In 
  
  
 
 
 
14 
Internet Governance Project 
c/o School of Information Studies, Syracuse University Syracuse, NY USA 13244 
http://internetgovernance.org 
 
 
 the new environment of address scarcity and relative need, ARIN should not care 
whether an organization that wants to release addresses acquired them from 
ARIN two years ago, one year ago, or 20 years ago. The point is that they have 
too many addresses and want to sell them, and that someone else needs them 
and wants to buy them. ARIN policy should concentrate more on making sure 
that releasers of address resources are the legitimate and valid holders of the 
resources, and not attempt to punish them for participating in the market. To 
discourage gaming and speculation, after an organization sells addresses into 
the market, it should of course not be able to go immediately to an RIR and ask 
for free assignments. A one year “time out” after a release/sale is a reasonable 
requirement. But as time passes it is unlikely that there will be any free IPv4 
address blocks for ARIN to distribute, anyway.  
Route aggregation.  
If address blocks released into the transfer market are subdivided into many 
parts, address transfers could lead to more de-aggregation of routes. All three of the 
transfer policies attempt to limit the impact of transfers on route aggregation, although 
in different ways: 
1. RIPE and APNIC propose simple rules that set a minimum size of the blocks to 
be transferred. For RIPE, a /21 (a little more than 1,000 contiguous addresses) 
is the minimum size address block. For APNIC, a /24 (a little more than 250 
contiguous addresses) is the minimum size.  
2. As usual, ARIN adopts the most detailed and prescriptive policy. It also considers 
a /24 the minimum size, but imposes on releasing parties detailed regulation of 
the way in which larger address blocks can be cut up into smaller ones.24 
Without a much longer and more detailed study it is difficult to assess the 
economic and technical impact of ARIN’s attempts to control the impact of 
transfers on route aggregation. Strictly speaking, ISPs are not obligated to route 
addresses simply because RIRs have allocated them. Smaller address blocks 
that enter into the transfer process might not be routed if ISPs reach the limit of 
what their routers can bear. Thus, in a true transfer market, one would expect 
the price of addresses to reflect their quality, with routability being a critical 
aspect of quality. Smaller blocks with a low probability of being routed should be 
devalued relative to larger ones. Deaggregation could cause an increase in the 
costs of ISPs; but at the same time, some ISPs might willingly bear those costs if 
it meant additional customers. It is not clear whether ARIN’s detailed 
prescriptions are needed. The assembly of contiguous blocks by aggregators of 
address resources for leasing by third parties could also overcome this problem. 
                                                 
24 See ARIN Policy sections 8.3.3 and 8.3.6. “The transferor may retain one contiguous address range out of their original 
allocation or assignment for their own use, and transfer the other contiguous address range. If the address range to be 
transferred consists of multiple non-aggregatable CIDR blocks, each may be transferred to a different transferee. The 
retained address range may not be further subdivided or transferred for a period of 12 months. Notwithstanding the 
preceding, the block may be subdivided as provided in section 8.3.6.” 
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 Fees 
In the ARIN and APNIC proposals, the buyer pays a “transfer fee” in addition to 
the normal fees associated with holding and servicing address resources. In the RIPE 
proposal, no transfer fee is mentioned; re-allocated blocks are considered to be no 
different from the allocations made directly by the RIPE NCC. If the purpose of the policy 
is to encourage efficient transfers, then the transfer process should not create costs that 
normal address holdings don’t incur, which the RIPE policy does. Although address 
transfers do create costs for the RIRs to update their registrations and records, the same 
costs are incurred when any other changes take place in RIR’s records. This may or may 
not be a significant problem, depending on the size of the fees and the costs associated 
with updating records and verifying the authenticity of the parties involved in the 
transfer. A small, one-time transfer fee probably would not create a strong disincentive 
to engage in transfers. 
Summary 
There are important variations in the address transfer market policies of RIPE, 
APNIC and ARIN. The most important differences pertain to eligibility and the approach 
to regulating speculation. For reasons that are not clear, RIPE’s policy does not permit 
end user organizations to transfer addresses, while the other ones do. RIPE would 
regulate resale by a buyer (which we believe is the correct approach). APNIC’s policy 
regulates the post-transfer address requests of the seller of addresses, and does not 
regulate the buyer at all (a mistake). ARIN over-regulates both sides of the transaction. A 
common structural approach should be adopted by all three. We suggest that both end 
user organizations and ISPs be eligible. We suggest that buyers of address resources not 
be allowed to resell them for two years, and that sellers not be allowed to request IPv4 
address resources from an RIR for one year after the sale. These restrictions should be 
globally applicable. We suggest that ARIN dispense with the pre-qualification of buyers 
and concentrate on identifying and verifying the authenticity of sellers. On the issue of 
route aggregation, transfer policies should retain a common minimum size. They should 
also make it explicit that an RIR’s role in recording and facilitating address transfers 
carries no guarantee of routability. The price of the address blocks should reflect the 
risks associated with attempting to use them, and the ISPs themselves should decide 
how many additional route announcements they can carry.  
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 ARIN RIPE APNIC 
Trigger for 
starting  
Last IANA block 
allocated 
No trigger No trigger 
Relationship 
to RIR 
Both seller and buyer 
must be resident in 
ARIN territory, and the 
addresses must be 
used in that territory. 
Address space may only 
be re-allocated from a 
RIPE NCC member to 
another member of the 
RIPE NCC. 
The address block 
must be administered 
by APNIC and 
allocated or assigned 
to a current APNIC 
account holder. 
Eligibility Any ARIN member 
Only LIRs; end users are 
not eligible 
Any APNIC member 
Trafficking 
restrictions 
Seller cannot have 
received any IPv4 
addresses from ARIN 
or from transfers in 
the past 24 months. 
Seller cannot request 
any for the next 24 
months. ARIN decides 
how much supply the 
buyer gets.  
Buyer cannot re-
allocate complete or 
partial blocks of the 
same address space for 
24 months. 
Seller cannot receive 
any IPv4 addresses 
from APNIC for a 
period of 24 months. 
Future requests to 
APNIC must be 
justified. 
Need 
assessment 
of recipient 
Buyer must “pre-
qualify” to be eligible. 
Buyer must justify 
both existing 
allocations and the 
amount transferred. 
None No need assessment 
unless additional 
requests for IPv4 
addresses made 
Fees 
Buyer pays a transfer 
fee in addition to 
normal fees 
associated with all 
addresses held 
No transfer fee 
mentioned. Re-
allocated blocks no 
different from the 
allocations made 
directly by the RIPE NCC 
Buyer pays a transfer 
fee in addition to 
normal fees 
associated with all 
addresses held 
Aggregation 
/24 minimum. 
Detailed regulation of 
way in which address 
blocks are downsized 
 
A /21 is the minimum 
size 
 
A /24 is the 
minimum size 
 
Table 1: Comparison of RIR IPv4 Address Transfer Policies 
 
In the short term, it is wise to keep the transfer markets regionally segregated in 
order to reduce the complexity of policy implementation and to limit the scope of any 
mistakes or problems that are discovered. But in the longer term policies should 
seriously explore modifications that would allow inter-regional transfers. Because of the 
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 concentration of IPv4 resources in North America and the faster growth rates of 
developing countries, there are likely to be a major need for moving resources globally. 
ARIN in particular might want to find a way to authorize the one-way export of address 
resources from its region to poorer countries.  
Issues and Debates around Address Transfers 
This section reviews some of the argumentation that has emerged around 
transfer policies. A great deal of the debate on this question has been emotional and 
somewhat irrational. Many of the arguments against transfer markets are based on a 
hidden assumption that the free pool will not be depleted. They tend to compare an 
idealized version of the way things worked in the past to the unknown risks and 
problems of a transfer market. This is not the comparison we need to make. Some kind 
of change is unavoidable. The driver of change is the depletion of the IPv4 pool of 
unallocated addresses, which is something no one can stop. The only valid policy 
debates revolve around different ways of adjusting to that new reality. In this context, a 
transfer market with simple barriers to rapid speculation is less radical than the only 
other two alternatives. One alternative is to push people into IPv6 adoption by adopting 
the brick wall approach; i.e., telling the world that there are no more IPv4 addresses and 
turning away all applicants. This is a radical and potentially disruptive policy. The other 
alternative to transfer markets is an aggressive IPv4 reclamation program that allows a 
centralized authority to audit organizations’ usage on their own initiative and unilaterally 
take away addresses from one organization to move them to another. This, too, is a far 
more dramatic change from current practice than a transfer market.  
Transfers and the migration to IPv6 
Some critics argue that a transfer market would slow down or harm the 
transition to IPv6. A transfer market, they say, might encourage organizations to 
consider purchasing more IPv4 addresses instead of firmly committing themselves to an 
IPv6 migration strategy.  
  
Note that this argument implicitly concedes that a transfer market would work. 
Transfer markets would cause organizations to defer their IPv6 migration plans only if 
the transfers succeeded in facilitating reclamation and use of a significant stock of 
unused IPv4 addresses. In effect, those who make this argument are saying that we 
should maintain artificial limits on the availability of IPv4 addresses in order to force 
organizations and ISPs to migrate to IPv6 more quickly.  
  
That policy seems like a dangerous one. The depletion of the free pool of IPv4 
addresses could trigger a coordinated movement to IPv6 only if IPv6 was backwards 
compatible. But it is not. We know that IPv4 addresses will be needed for some time to 
maintain compatibility between the two Internets as the migration takes place. 
Unfortunately, many of the compatibility issues associated with large-scale dual stack 
implementation and NAT-PT are not well understood. The transition could turn out to be 
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 more complicated, costly and difficult than anticipated, and we don’t know how long it 
will last. If we try to use an address shortage to force ISPs into making the transition 
before they are ready, we could develop damaging gaps in connectivity due to shortages 
of address resources and compatibility problems.  
  
There are really only two possibilities: either 1) address scarcity in the IPv4 space 
makes migration to IPv6 inevitable, or 2) migration to IPv6 is not inevitable, and 
Network Address Translators and other workarounds can keep IPv4 alive indefinitely.  
 
If a migration to IPv6 is inevitable, a transfer market could only prolong the 
transition slightly, it could not stop it. A transfer market can only shift address resources 
from organizations who are not using them to active use, and from lower-valued uses to 
higher-valued uses. Transfers do not create more addresses. Given the uncertainties 
surrounding the costs, duration, and technical problems of the transition, extending the 
time horizon for decisions to migrate to IPv6 seems like a good idea. It is certainly a less 
risky strategy than creating an abrupt shortage. 
  
If migration to IPv6 is not inevitable then any attempt to force people into IPv6 
by preventing more efficient use of remaining IPv4 addresses could simply fail, and even 
backfire badly. Organizations might respond to the artificial shortage with an intensified 
NAT strategy, or find ways to acquire the IPv4 address resources they needed via 
subterfuge and underground transactions.  
  
Ultimately, the real impetus to switch to IPv6 is that it can deliver applications 
and capabilities that IPv4 can’t – including the ability to do things that require larger 
amounts of address space. When the special applications and capabilities of IPv6 reach 
critical mass and organizations can realize network externalities by switching to it, a 
bandwagon effect will start and a complete migration will take place. Since no one can 
predict when, or even whether, that will happen, we must prioritize efficient and flexible 
management of the IPv4 address pool. We should not gamble with the fate of the 
Internet we have in order to push people into one that doesn’t exist yet. 
What happens if no transfers are allowed?  
We need to focus more on the central question: If the IPv4 free pool is exhausted and we 
don’t institute a transfer policy, what is likely to happen? The most probable result would 
be: 
• The intensification and spread of black or gray transfer markets 
• Strengthening the market power of incumbent telephone companies and ISPs  
• Inefficient or wasted utilization of large swaths of the existing IPv4 address space 
 
By preventing firms and organizations from trading address blocks, ARIN would 
simply push the supply and demand pressures surrounding address scarcity into 
different channels. One likely result is address hoarding. In an IPv4-depleted world 
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 without transfers, holders of address resources will do everything in their power to justify 
their continued possession of them. They might need it some day, and they might be 
able to sell it on the black market or increase their value in an acquisition. Unless the 
power of RIRs to reclaim addresses from assignees is significantly strengthened, it is 
difficult to see any plausible scenario in which major unused blocks of the address space 
come back to an RIR. 
  
A second response to increased scarcity would be underground transfers. We 
already know that these are taking place as a response to the relatively minor economic 
barriers created by the ARIN application process. Imagine the pressure once the free 
pool is gone. The long term implications of fostering an address economy outside the 
accurate registration and contractual administration facilities of the RIRs are pretty 
disturbing. Indeed, we may already be too late. One of the most accurate and 
troublesome criticisms that could be made of a transfer market is that it might do 
nothing. Would the incentives generated be strong enough to pull unused resources out? 
Are the complexities of getting transferred address resources into the routing table too 
great? We should be more concerned about the possibility that such a market wouldn’t 
have any impact than we should be about the remote possibility that it will destabilize 
the Internet economy. 
  
Yet another channel through which suppressed demand and supply forces will 
flow is the acquisition of firms and their assets. Since it is already “legal” to acquire 
addresses by acquiring the firms that hold them, creative legal and corporate structures 
will be set up to transfer addresses by making it look like a corporate acquisition or a 
shift of assets internal to a corporation or holding company. And of course the simplest 
and most legitimate way to gain IPv4 address resources in the absence of a transfer 
market will be by simply taking over an incumbent address holder. Take this logic a little 
further, and it seems plausible to conclude that the absence of a transfer market will 
encourage greater consolidation of the ISP industry than we would have otherwise. 
Industry consolidation in communications networks is already a source of great concern 
to antitrust authorities and public interest groups. Anything that encourages it is not a 
desirable policy. 
Incumbents and developing countries  
 Some commentators have claimed that a transfer market will favor incumbents. 
But the incumbents themselves say something different. The European telephone 
companies are staunch opponents of address transfer markets.25 This may be nothing 
more than conservatism. But ETNO and similar established ISPs also may know that if 
there is nowhere else to go for addresses, Internet users will have to come to them to 
draw on their existing stocks, which can be leveraged as an appreciating asset like 
Rembrandt paintings. The rigidity of a transfer-less IPv4 market strengthens their 
                                                 
25 European Telecommunications Network Operators Association. 2008. “IP Addressing in a post IPv4 World – Principles.” 
ETNO Expert Contribution EC097, 2008/05 (May).ETNO Report 
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 market power. Large incumbents are also in the best position to gain additional address 
resources through acquisitions. 
 
Likewise, some have asserted that developing countries would be harmed by a 
transfer policy because IPv4 address resources would become more expensive. But this 
argument is fallacious because it assumes that free addresses will continue to be 
available to developing countries. They won’t. Once the free pool is depleted, there are 
no addresses to hand out to developing countries – or anyone else. So unless addresses 
are transferred among existing users, latecomers to the Internet, such as ISPs in less 
developed economies, simply will not be able to get IPv4 addresses. Since developing 
countries by definition start with fewer addresses than developed countries and are 
likely to generate more demand in the future, anything that facilitates transfers is in 
their interest. 
 
Short-term, the two RIRs in developing country regions would probably run out of 
addresses a lot later than the three developed regions, because the utilization levels of 
their already assigned blocks are actually lower there. Post-depletion, a transfer market 
is more likely to succeed in shaking loose new blocks of unused IPv4 addresses that 
could be transferred to developing country ISPs. Unless there is an open and globally 
integrated transfer market, IPv4 depletion will make ISPs in developing countries more 
dependent on large-scale incumbent ISPs in the North, because that is where the 
addresses currently are. Growing developing economies can and do successfully bid 
against the developed world for critical resources and industrial inputs, such as oil. There 
is no reason to assume that they cannot acquire address resources, too. 
 
To conclude, the Internet community needs to lay aside irrational fears of the 
unknown and adopt sensible, well-designed IPv4 address transfer policies. These 
policies could be instituted immediately; there is no economic justification for waiting for 
the exhaustion of the free pool.  
 
 
